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Worker mobility is necessary for the efficient 
operation of the labor market, so that the best 
matches can be found between workers and 
employers. Employers have only limited infor- 
mation about the abilities of each prospective 
worker, however. When making hiring decisions, 
they take the chance of employing a worker who 
does not have the skills (and thus the productiv- 
ity) that was originally expected. 
Both high- and low-productivity workers seek 
higher-paying jobs at any given time. The prob- 
lem facing the employer is how to distinguish 
between the two. Low-productivity job searchers, 
of course, try to pass themselves off as high- 
productivity workers. The employer can discern 
a worker's true abilities only after the hiring 
decision has been made, however. Because of 
this asymmetrical information, workers' ability to 
change jobs and find the best match may be 
seriously impaired. Consequently, the labor 
market may not work efficiently. 
This paper suggests that asymmetrical informa- 
tion can result in adverse selection. Adverse 
selection is a term coined by Akerlof (1970) to 
explain why the used-car market is dominated 
by "lemons." Car owners, he argues, often sell 
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their vehicles because of poor performance or 
unreliability. Potential buyers realize the owner's 
motivation and pay less for a used car because of 
the likelihood of purchasing a lemon. The ten- 
dency is then reinforced for new-car owners to 
sell their vehicles only if they are unreliable. 
Thus, adverse selection can explain why a new 
automobile sells for considerably less as soon as 
it is driven off the showroom floor. In the case of 
the labor market, adverse selection comes about 
because low-productivity  workers may change 
jobs in order to be confused with high- 
productivity job-changers. 
A model of worker mobility based on adverse 
selection can help to explain several stylized 
facts of the labor market, particularly in regard to 
job turnover and wages. First, as Mincer (1984) 
shows, frequent job mobility among older 
workers results in lower wages. Second, while 
earnings for all workers tend to increase over 
time, older workers who quit generally experi- 
ence zero or negative wage growth (Bartel and 
Borjas [I9811  ).  Adverse selection can also help 
to explain why workers who have had a history 
of frequent job moves are more likely to move 
in the future. 
For the same reason that lemons may domi- 
nate the used-car market, lower-productivity 
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workers will then have lower wages, on average, 
compared to infrequent job-changers. This can 
explain why mobility among older workers 
results in lower wages and why prior mobility 
can predict future mobility. 
These empirical regularities are frequently 
explained by combining the concept of "firm- 
specific" human capital with the assumption that 
workers differ in their propensities to change 
jobs. Firm-specific human capital is knowledge 
that increases workers' productivity at their pres- 
ent firm, but that cannot be transferred to other 
firms. Thus, as a worker's tenure with the same 
firm increases, his or her firm-specific knowl- 
edge grows, pushing up his or her productivity. 
Frequent job-movers would invest in less firm- 
specific human capital, since the knowledge they 
gain on the job would be forfeited after each job 
change. The argument is then that frequent job- 
movers would have lower average wages and 
flatter age-earnings profiles than infrequent job- 
changers. Consequently, infrequent job-movers 
would have a steeper age-earnings  profile than 
would the frequent job-movers. 
Arguments based on firm-specific  human capi- 
tal have some problems explaining these obser- 
vations of the labor market, however. First, no 
reasons are given for the assumed difference in 
propensities among workers to change jobs. 
Second, the firm-specific  human capital model 
cannot explain the relationship between wages 
and turnover in light of work by Salop and Salop 
(1976). They show that if a worker's propensity 
to move is not public information, then the 
infrequent job-changers would post bonds at 
firms in order to separate themselves from the 
frequent job-movers. The implication is that the 
wage rates for job-movers should be higher than 
those of job-stayers in the early part of their 
careers-an  observation that is inconsistent with 
the findings of Bartel and Borjas. 
Third, if  a substantial number of firms require 
general rather than firm-specific  human capital, 
then frequent movers would sort themselves 
into these firms. They thus would have steeper 
age-earnings profiles because they would bear 
the full cost of acquiring the general human cap- 
ital. In firms with primarily firm-specific  human 
capital, the costs would be shared by both the 
worker and the employer. 
The adverse-selection model of labor mobility 
can help explain these empirical anomalies with- 
out relying on firm-specific  human capital. More- 
over, it provides a basis for examining the wel- 
fare implications of "lemons" (low-productivity 
workers) in the labor market. The model predicts 
that mobility is hampered because frequent 
moves can brand a person as a low-productivity 
worker. However, it is shown that government sub- 
sidies to increase mobility would be ineffective. 
The model is developed in several steps. The 
basic assumptions are presented in section I. 
The first version of the model incorporates con- 
tingent wage contracting, which in effect allows 
firms to sort among workers according to pro- 
ductivity. In this case, it is shown that adverse 
selection is not a problem, since all workers are 
paid their expected output. 
The remaining versions of the model exclude 
contingent wage contracts, which introduces the 
situation in which all workers receive the same 
wage, ex ante. This pooling of low- and high- 
productivity workers creates adverse selection, 
where the low-productivity  workers are the fre- 
quent job-changers. 
Example 2 of the model assumes that workers 
post no bonds, in which case the worker's wage 
in every period is the firm's estimate of his or 
her productivity. Next, example 3 allows bond- 
ing, which benefits high-productivity workers 
(the infrequent job-changers) and hurts low- 
productivity workers (the frequent job-changers). 
Bonds arise in order for firms to compete for the 
high-productivity  workers. Finally, example 4 is a 
two-period model with bonding. This example is 
useful for discussing the welfare implications of 
the model, which are presented in section 11. 
I.  Job  Mobility 
and Adverse Selection 
In the following model of the labor market, 
workers are assumed to live and work for three 
periods indexed by 1, 2, and 3. A three-period 
horizon allows the model to explain why 
workers who moved frequently in the past are 
more likely to move in the future. At  the end of 
periods one and two, workers decide whether to 
continue working at their present job  or to 
change jobs. Workers change jobs if the change 
raises the expected value of their future wages. 
Productivity at a firm consists of a job- 
matching component, 8, and an individual- 
specific component,  p.  The labor contribution to 
production is represented by the simple linear 
relation y = p + 8. A worker's base productivity 
level, p,  is assumed to be constant across firms. 
The matching component, 8,  varies across firms, 
so workers shop around in order to improve 
their job match. However, since only the workers 
know their own base productivity,  p,  firms can- 
not immediately observe whether a new worker 
changed jobs because he was a high-productivity 
worker with a bad job  match or because he was 
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fused with a high-productivity job-changer. 
The following restrictions are placed on the 
distributions of p and 8:  p is assumed to be dis- 
tributed on the interval [p',  p"] with a cumula- 
tive distribution function of F (p)  and a density 
function off (p);  8  is assumed to be distributed 
on the interval [-8',  8"] with a cumulative dis- 
tribution function of G (8)  and a density func- 
tion of g (8)  with E  (8)  = 0. In addition, it is 
assumed that 8  is independent both across indi- 
viduals and across different jobs, and that p and 
8  are independently distributed random varia- 
bles. Thus, a worker's current job match-or  the 
quality of another worker's match-does  not 
provide the worker with any information regard- 
ing his match at another firm. Similarly, a worker's 
productivity does not indicate which job or task 
he will be most productive in performing. 
Prior to production, neither firms nor workers 
know what 8  will be, although workers know 
their own productivity type, p. After one period, 
a worker's output at the firm, y, is assumed to be 
perfectly observable by both the worker and the 
firm. Furthermore, it is assumed that a worker's 
output at a firm is constant over time but cannot 
be observed by other firms.' 
For simplicity, it is assumed that firms cannot 
observe an applicant's past wage rates. This 
ensures that workers who did not move after the 
initial period will not move in subsequent peri- 
ods. The only reason a worker would want to 
move after the second period would be to find a 
better job match. He would not move after 
period two, however, because the incentive to 
search for a better match declines with age. 
Example 1:  Mobility 
and Wages With Contingent 
Wage  Contracts 
This section examines the model's properties in 
an economy with no restrictions on types of 
wage contracts offered, in order to show that the 
stylized facts of the labor market cannot be 
explained without adverse selection. The model 
predicts that workers will be paid their realized 
output, y, at the end of each period. This is 
called a contingent wage contract, because a 
worker's pay is contingent on his or her realized 
output in that period. 
8 1  This assumption is not crucial because observing a worker's output at 
a previous firm would give a potential employer a "noisy" signal of a worker's 
base productivity level. 
Since workers are risk-neutral,  they are indif- 
ferent between accepting a wage equal to their 
base productivity level, p,  or accepting a wage 
equal to their realized output, y.  Contingent 
wage contracts in effect allow firms to sort 
among workers according to productivity. If 
workers are paid based on their output, the 
model collapses to a simple version of a stan- 
dard job-matching model, in which workers 
move only to seek better matches. 
Define Wl(p)  to be the value of future wage 
payments at the beginning of the first period for a 
worker with a base productivity level ofp; define 
E(y)  to be the value of future wage payments at 
the beginning of period two for a worker who 
produced y = p + 81 in the first period and 
decided not to move; and define hz(p,  82) to be 
the value of future wage payments for a worker 
who moved after the first period. 
(1)  W(P) 
= p + 13,  +  EI max[hz(p,  821, &(Y)] 
where 
= p+ a +  EZ~~X[P+  O~,P+ 
and 
8  = match at i th firm, 
El  = expectation given the information at 
the end of period t. 
W  (p)  consists of the worker's first-period 
wage (the value of his productivity p +81)  and 
either A2  or V2, depending on whether he 
switches jobs after the first period. A worker 
switches jobs if  h2 > V,, but stays at his job if 
A,  5  V,. If a worker does not move after period 
one, he earns his output, y = p + 8,, in both 
periods two and three. A worker who moves 
after period one will earn p + 8, in the second 
period and then either his output, p + 02,  if he 
stays and works at this firm again in period three, 
or p if he switches jobs once more. A worker 
who changes jobs after the first period will do so 
again if  his output, p + 82  ,  is less than p (his 
expected wage if he moves). Thus, a worker 
who changes jobs after the first period does so 
again if 8 < 0. Figure 1  depicts a worker's wage 
based on whether he moves or stays at his firm 
after periods one and two. 
The reservation output level for a p - 
productivity worker, yr(p),  is defined to be the 
wage at which the worker is indifferent between 
staying and leaving, V,(yr(p))  =  El  h2(p,  82) 
= hz(p).  A worker stays at his present job ifp + 
81  > yr(p).  This definition implies the following 
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expressions for the expected values of  W,  I/, and 
h (where E denotes the expectations operator): 
(3)  Ehz(p) = P  +  G  (O)P 
+  (I-G  (O))(p  +  E (821 8 2  0)) 
The probability that a worker leaves after the 
first period, 81  < yr  (p)  - p,  is given by 
G (yr(p)-p),  since G is the cumulative distri- 
bution function of 8. Similarly, G  (0)  is the 
probability that 82  < 0  and is the probability 
that a worker will move after period two if he 
moved after the first period. The expected value 
of future wages for a worker who moved after 
the first period,  ha@),  is his expected wage in 
the second period, p,  plus the product of his 
probability of moving again, G  (O), and his aver- 
age wage if  he moves again, p,  plus the proba- 
bility that he does not move, (1-G  (O)),  multi- 
plied by his expected wage if he stays, 
p  +  E (821 82  2 0). 
If  we further assume that the 8s are uniformly 
distributed over the interval (4,  8'),  then the res- 
ervation output for a risk-neutral p -productivity 
worker with no search costs is yr (p)  = p +8'/8. 
The probability that a worker moves after period 
zero would then be G (yr(p)-p)  = 9/16,  and 
the probability that a worker moves after period 
two, given he moved after period one, would be 
G  (0)  =  1/2.  These separation probabilities are 
constant across workers, implying that adverse 
selection is not a problem. The reason is that, on 
average,  workers are paid their expected output,p. 
The example predicts that job-movers-those 
with the worst matches-earn  lower wages. How- 
ever, it cannot explain why these same workers 
have less future wage growth. Similarly, the driving 
force behind this result is the matching character- 
istic, which can explain the mobility of younger 
workers. However, it cannot explain the empirical 
evidence which suggests that older workers, but 
not younger workers, are hurt when moving. 
Because most wage contracts are not contin- 
gent on a worker's future output, the remaining 
examples in this paper exclude contingent wage 
contracts. This introduces a pooling equilibrium, 
where, ex ante, all workers receive the same 
wage. The result is adverse selection, where the 
low-productivity  workers are the frequent 
job-changers. 
Adverse selection can explain why older work- 
ers are seemingly worse off after they move. 
Although a job-matching model is not realistic 
when considering the mobility of older workers, 
the assumption is maintained in order to ensure 
that some workers always change jobs. The 
matching component is not necessary for the fol- 
lowing  example^.^  The next example examines 
the implications of the model excluding both 
contingent wage contracts and bonds, so  that a 
worker's wage in every period is his expected 
output in that period. 
Example 2:  Mobility and 
Wages Without  Contingent 
Wage  Contracts and  Bonds 
The examples given in tables 1-4  assume that 
there are two types of workers, who can have 
three possible outputs at a firm. Half of the 
workers are high-productivity  with p =  2;  the 
rest are low-productivity  with p = 1.  The job- 
matching component is assumed to take on 
three values (-1,O, or I), each of which occurs 
with a one-third probability. 
This example considers an equilibrium where 
no bonds are posted, that is, where a worker's 
wage in every period is the firm's estimate of his 
or her productivity. This implies that there will 
be a pooling equilibrium and that all workers 
will receive the same wage in the first period. 
With these assumptions, the solution given in 
tables 1 and 2 can be verified. 
2  See Greenwald (1986). 
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1  2  3 
Output at which a  yr  (1) = 1.4  ws = 6/5  - 
low-productivity 
worker is indifferent 
between moving and 
staying 
Fraction of workers  2/3  2/3  - 
who move at end 
of period 
Wages for a low-  3/2  y=  2  y=  2 
productivity worker 
who never moves 
Wages for a low-  3/2  wz  = 4/3  y=  2 
productivity worker 
who moves only after 
period one 
Wages for a low-  3/2  wz  = 4/3  w3 = 6/5 
productivity worker 
who moves after both 
periods one and two 
NOTE:  wz  = the second-period  wage for workers who changed jobs after 
period one; w:, = the third-period wage for workers who changed jobs after 
periods one and two. 
SOURCE: Author. 
The transition probabilities and wages given 
in tables 1 and 2 can be shown to solve the 
preceding problem. First assume that the separa- 
tion rates in the tables are correct. They can then 
be used to verify the wages, wn and ws.  Given 
that the wages are consistent with the separation 
rates, it is then necessary to show that these 
wages imply the separation rates posited. 
For example, if the reservation output for a 
high-productivity  worker is 1.7,  then he  will leave 
his original firm if  y < 1.7 or equivalently if 
yl = 1,  which occurs one-third of the time. 
High-productivity  workers who stay will earn their 
output, which is either y = 2 or y = 3. If  a high- 
productivity worker moved after period one, he 
would move again if yz < ws =  6/5.  This 
occurs one-third of the time, or when yn =  1. 
Similarly, low-productivity  workers will move 
two-thirds of the time given their reservation 
outputs. With these transition probabilities, we 
can calculate the wages of job-movers. Then, Az 
and V (y)  can be calculated with these wages to 
verify that the reservation output for a low- 
productivity worker, yr  (I), is 1.4, while the res- 
ervation output for a high-productivity  worker, 
yr  (2),  is 1.7. 
Notice that the low-productivity  workers move 
twice as often as the high-productivity  workers: 
two-thirds (one-third) of the low- (high-) pro- 
ductivity workers move after period one, while 
two-thirds (one-third) of those who moved pre- 
viously move again after period two. This is a 
result of adverse selection. 
Example 3:  Mobility 
and Wages Without 
Contingent Contracts, 
Bonding  Allowed 
Because of the difference in mobility between 
high- and low-productivity  workers, example 2 
cannot be an equilibrium once bonding is 
allowed. Firms could earn positive profits by try- 
ing to compete for the high-productivity  workers, 
since firms make money by employing these 
workers and lose money by employing low- 
productivity workers. 
Because high-productivity  workers move only 
half as often as low-productivity  workers, firms 
try to attract the high-productivity  workers by 
requiring incoming workers to post bonds that 
are paid according to their future mobility. Those 
who change jobs forfeit their bonds, while the 
job-stayers split the proceeds of the bonds. 
Bonding implies that workers no longer earn 
their expected productivity every period: instead, 
they are paid less than their expected productivity 
in the first period of an employment contract, 
and make up for this loss in later periods. The 
amount of the bond is the difference between a 
worker's expected productivity and his wage dur- 
ing the first period of an employment contract. In 
later periods, a worker is paid more than his mar- 
ginal productivity,  the bonus being the difference 
between his wage and his expected productivity. 
Bonding benefits the high-productivity 
workers-those  who move infrequently-and 
hurts the low-productivity  workers-the  frequent 
job-movers. Because bonds offset some of the 
income gained by the low-productivity  workers 
as a result of adverse selection, they redistribute 
income from the low-productivity  workers to the 
high-productivity  workers. Competition for high- 
productivity workers ensures that workers post 
bonds, although in equilibrium, bonding may 
not be sufficient to separate workers according 
to their respective productivities. 
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1  2  3 
Output at which a  yr  (1) = 1.7  w3 = 6/5  - 
high-productivity 
worker is indifferent 
between moving 
and staying 
Fraction of workers 
who move at end 
of period 
Wages for a high-  3/2  y=2or3  y=2or3 
productivity worker 
who never moves 
Wages for a high-  3/2  wz  = 4/3  y = 2 or 3 
productivity worker 
who moves only after 
period one 
Wages for a high-  3/2  wz  = 4/3  ws = 6/5 
productivity worker 
who moves after both 
periods one and two 
NOTE: wz =  the second-period  wage for workers who changed  jobs after 
period  one; ws  =  the  third-period wage for workers who changed  jobs after 
periods one  and two. 
SOURCE:  Author. 
SOURCE: Author. 
Define bl to be the bonus paid to workers 
who did not change jobs after period one, and. 
define bz to be the bonus paid to workers who 
switched jobs after period one and stayed after 
period two. Figure 2 depicts a worker's wage 
based on whether he moves or stays at his firm 
after periods one and two. Given the structure of 
bonding as described above, tables 3 and 4 illus- 
trate the solution for this example.3 
Tables 3 and 4 are an equilibrium for this 
example, since a potential firm could never suc- 
cessfully compete for either a low-productivity  or 
a high-productivity  worker. The low-productivity 
workers are still being confused with the high- 
productivity workers and thus do  better than 
they would if  they admitted that they were low- 
productivity workers and were paid their 
expected output, 1, every time they moved and 
did not post any bonds. 
It can also be shown that if the amount of the 
bond posted by workers changed, the high- 
productivity workers would be made worse off.4 
This is because the bonuses, bl and bz,  are the 
largest possible so that the high-productivity 
workers still move. (That is, b1 and bz are 
chosen such that a high-productivity  worker who 
produces an output of 1 would be indifferent 
between moving and staying.) If  61 were 
increased, high-productivity  workers would 
never move, even if they have a bad match, 
O = -1. If  bz were increased, high-productivity 
workers would never move after period two and 
would be made worse off. 
This example illustrates that adverse selection 
is present in the model, since two-thirds (one- 
third) of the low- (high-)  productivity workers 
3  Since two-thirds (one-third) of  the (low-) high-productivity  workers 
move after period zero and again after period one, the expected productivity of 
a worker who changes jobs after the first period is [(213 x  112 x  1) + (113 x 
112 x 2)]  1 [(213 x 112) + (113 x  1/2)] = 413;  the expected productivity of  a 
worker who changes jobs after both periods is [(213 x 213 x 112 x  1) + (113 x 
113 x  112 x 2)] I  [(213 x 213  x 112) + (113 x  113 x  1/2)] = 615; and the 
expected productivity  of a worker in the initial period is simply [(I12 x  1) + 
(112 x 2)] = 312.  The  wages reported in the text can be  obtained as follows. In 
the first period, the probability that a worker stays at his present job  is 112, 
therefore WI  = 312  -(1/2)1b~  = 1019; similarly, the conditional probability that 
a worker changes jobs after the second period given that he changed jobs after 
the first period is 419,  therefore wz  = 413 - (419) .b2  = 56/45; and the wage 
for a worker who changes jobs  twice is his expected productivity, w3 = 716. 
4  Under the assumptions of  this model, bonds cannot be made contin- 
gent  on  a worker's realized output. Bonds are allowed to be made contingent 
only on  a worker's decision either to move or  to stay at the firm. The  more 
general case, when the bond can depend on y,  has proven intractable. Intui- 
tion suggests that including this more general case would make it more likely 
that a separating equilibrium will exist, but if there is enough variability in the 
job-matching component, 0,  then there will be groups of workers in which a 
pooling equilibrium will still result. The  remainder of  the  paper maintains the 
assumption that the return on bonds cannot depend on y. 
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low-productivity 
worker is indifferent 
between moving 
and staying 
Fraction of workers 
who move at end 
of period 
Wages for a low- 
productivity worker 
who never moves 
Wages for a low- 
productivity worker 
who moves only after 
period one 
Wages for a low- 
productivity worker 
who moves after both 
periods one and two 
Period 
1 
Period  Period 
2  3 
NOTE:  wz  =  the second-period wage for workers who changed jobs after 
period one; w3  = the third-period wage for workers who changed jobs after 
periods one and two. 
SOURCE: Author. 
move after period one, and two-thirds (one- 
third) of these workers move again after the 
second period. Wages for both job-movers and 
job-stayers increase over the life cycle, although 
at a slower rate for job-movers. 
Notice also that the increase in wages for 
movers is not monotonic over time: it reaches a 
maximum in period one and drops off slightly in 
the last period. Workers who move twice con- 
tinue to earn more in the last period of their 
working life than they did in the first period; 
however, their wages decrease with their last job 
move. This is consistent with the findings of Bar- 
tel and Borjas (1981), who determine that for 
older men a quit can have either a zero or a 
negative effect on wage growth. 
The example also explains why prior mobility 
is an indicator of future mobility. The probability 
that a worker changes jobs in the first period is 
one-half, while the conditional probability that a 
worker changes jobs in the second period, given 
that he changed jobs in the first period, is five- 
ninths. In contrast, workers who did not move 
after the initial period will choose never to 
change jobs. The presence of movers and stayers 
results because low-productivity  workers move 
more often than high-productivity workers. 
The next example illustrates this result by a 
two-period example. The cost of using a two- 
period model is that the model can no longer 
explain why prior mobility is a good indicator of 
future mobility. The example helps illustrate 
how these results apply when workers have a 
continuum of different productivity types. 
Example 4:  Mobility and 
Wages in a Two-Period 
Example With  Bonding 
The following example is a two-period version of 
the model presented in example 3. Using the 
notation defined above, b is the bonus paid in 
the second period to job-stayers, while wl  is the 
first-period wage for all workers and wz  is the 
second-period wage for job-changers. In this 
example, p is allowed to vary continuously with 
the distribution function, f (p). Thus, each 
worker has a different productivity level. In addi- 
tion, we define A to be the fraction of workers 
who change jobs after the first period. Remem- 
bering that a worker will change jobs only if 
8 < wz - p - b,  A is determined as follows: 
The intuition behind this equation is simple. 
G  (m  - p - b) is the fraction of the p - 
productivity workers who change jobs after the 
first period. This fraction is then multiplied by 
f (p), the proportion of all workers who have a 
productivity of p. Summing this product over all 
productivity types gives the average mobility rate 
of workers. 
The second-period wage for job-movers is 
determined similarly: 
The intuition behind this equation is similar to 
that given above. G (wz - p - b)  f (p)/A  is the 
fraction of job-movers who have a productivity of 
p . Multiplying by p and summing over all 
workers gives the average productivity, or the 
average output, of a job-changer. 
The following example assumes that the 
matching component, 8, and the individual pro- 
ductivity component,  p, are both uniformly dis- 
tributed: 8 -  [-Of,  8'1  and p - [p  ',  p"] .  Fol- 
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satisfies 
Output at which a 
high-productivity 
worker is indifferent 
between moving 
and staying 
Fraction of workers 
who move at end 
of period 
Wages for a high- 
productivity worker 
who never moves 
Wages for a high- 
productivity worker 
who moves only after 
period one 
Wages for a high- 
productivity worker 
who moves after both 







NOTE:  wz  =  the second-period wage for workers who changed jobs after 
period one; wa  = the third-period wage for workers who changed jobs after 
periods one and two. 
SOURCE: Author. 
lowing example 3, a candidate equilibrium for 
this example is a pooling equilibrium (where all 
workers are treated identically ex ante), which 
maximizes the returns to the highest-productivity 
worker. Competition for the high-productivity 
workers, whom firms earn profits by employing, 
ensures that a pooling equilibrium is obtained 
by choosing a wage-bonus package (  wi, 6)  to 
maximize the expected return of the highest- 
productivity worker. 
(7)  max{wl +  ~rnax[p"+fl+b,  ~211 
wl,  b 
such that 
If  we further assume that p is uniformly dis- 
tributed between 1 and 2, the corresponding 
prices and quantities are 
A  =  1/2  - 1/48', 
b = (30'-2)/(6ef-31, 
WI  =  3/2  -(I-A)b, 
wz  =  (98'-5)/(60f-31, 
G (WZ  - p -6)  =  1/2 - (p  -1)/28',  and 
A  =  1/2  -i/4er. 
The above equations indicate that the more 
disperse 8 is (with respect top  ), the less impor- 
tant adverse selection is. Increasing 8' raises the 
wage rate of job-changers and workers' mobility. 
The reason is straightforward: increasing the var- 
iance of 8 diminishes the impact of adverse 
selection, since it increases the incentives for all 
workers to change jobs. When more workers 
change jobs, the probability that job-changers are 
"lemons" is reduced. 
Carlstrom also shows that an equilibrium for 
this example exists if  there is enough adverse 
selection in the labor market, that is, if 8'  2  1. If 
we restrict 8'  =  1, the corresponding prices and 
quantities are 
A  =  1/4, 
b =  11'3, 
W1  =  5/4, 
wz  = 4/3, and 
G(w2-p-  b) =  1 - p/2. 
Notice that the example is consistent with the 
stylized facts; workers experience a wage 
increase when they change jobs, yet they earn 
less over time than job-stayers who earn their 
output, y,  plus their bonus, one-third. 
The following section uses this example to 
discuss questions of optimality. 
II.  Welfare  Implications 
Example 4 illustrates another aspect of the 
model: in equilibrium there is less job mobility 
than occurs in a world with perfect information. 
This is not true for all workers, however. High- 
productivity workers move less often than they 
would in a world without adverse selektion,  while 
low-productivity  workers may or may not move 
less often. There are two reasons for this effect, 
both of which are due to adverse selection. The 
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model: adverse selection reduces the future 
wages for workers when they move and thus 
reduces the incentive to move. The second effect 
is due to the posting of bonds in equilibrium, 
which further reduces the incentives for mobility. 
The results of this section are shown with a 
two-period model, assuming that 9 is uniformly 
distributed. For most of the results, these assump- 
tions can be  relaxed. Without bonds, the probabil- 
ity that a worker with a productivity,  p,  will 
change jobs is G  (  wz -  p);  the average probabil- 
ity that a worker changes jobs is E {  G (  wz  -  p)  ] 
=  G (  wz  - E (p))  < G  (O),  where G (0)  is the 
probability that a worker would change jobs in a 
model without adverse selection. The posting of 
bonds accentuates this effect. In example 4, the 
unconditional probability that a worker moved 
was one-fourth, with the lowest-productivity 
worker moving half of the time, and the highest- 
productivity worker never moving. 
Since mobility is lower in this example than in 
a model with complete information, it is natural 
to ask whether a government could increase wel- 
fare by subsidizing mobility. An example of such 
a government subsidy is unemployment insur- 
ance. However, since there is no unemployment 
in the model, unemployment insurance cannot 
be analyzed. Instead, this paper models unem- 
ployment inswnce,  which decreases the costs 
of moving, as a subsidy to the wage of job- 
movers. It therefore asks whether a govemment 
can achieve a Pareto improvement by subsidiz- 
ing the wages of job-movers. Because a govem- 
ment does not have superior information about 
a worker's productivity, the answer is no. 
Subsidizing mobility would not benefit the 
highest-productivity  workers, so taxing them to 
pay for this subsidy would make them worse off. 
However, a stronger welfare result can be proven 
in this model. That is, a govemment cannot tax 
first-period wage income to subsidize the wages 
of job-changers in order to increase aggregate 
welfare.5  In fact, it is shown that if  a government 
subsidized the wages of job-movers, there would 
be no effect on the equilibrium allocations. With 
a subsidy of s, the equilibrium prices and alloca- 
tions from the second example are 
To verify that subsidizing w2  by s and taxing 
first-period income by As  has no  real effect, 
consider the above equations. Assuming the 
wage paid to job-movers by firms, wz, did not 
change, then from (8)  the equilibrium amount 
of the bonus would increase by s (or bonds 
would increase by (  1 - A  )s).  In other words, 
the amount of the bonus paid to the job-stayers 
would change one-for-one with the subsidy on 
WZ,  leaving mobility the same and thus implying 
(and verifying the assumption) that the wage 
paid to job-movers, wz, remains the same. There- 
fore, second-period income would increase by s 
for both movers and stayers, and first-period 
income would decrease by s.  The following are 
the new equilibrium allocations: 
(10') wz = Jpc(wz  -p- b)f(p)dp/~ 
= JPG (p  '  -  p)f  (p)dp  /A,  and 
(11') wl  =  E (p)  - (1  -h)b ' 
=  E (p)  - (1  -A)b - s. 
Quick inspection of equations (8)-(11)  and 
(8')-(  11') shows that subsidizing mobility affects 
neither mobility, (A),  nor total wages over time. 
Mobility stays the same, while wages in the first 
period for all workers decrease by the subsidy, 
and net wages in the second period increase by 
the subsidy. The intuition behind this result is 
straightforward. Subsidizing mobility benefits the 
frequent job-movers-the  low-productivity 
workers. In a pooling equilibrium, however, the 
returns to the highest-productivity  workers are 
maximized. The amount of the bond that would 
be posted in equilibrium would change one-for- 
one with the amount of the taxes to eliminate 
the effects of the government's action. 
8 5  This is in contrast to the welfare implications  of Akerlof's model, where 
a government could subsidize the trading of  cars and increase aggregate wel- 
fare in the sense that owners of the low-quality cars would gain more than 
owners of the high-quality cars would lose. 
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Adverse selection is thought to be prevalent in 
many markets. This paper argues that adverse 
selection may also be important in the labor 
market. It can explain why wages tend to 
increase as workers get older, except for fre- 
quent job-movers, whose wages may actually 
decrease in later years. It also can explain why 
older workers who move frequently have lower 
average wages than do  infrequent job-changers. 
Job-movers earn low wages because frequent 
mobility brands them as low-productivity 
workers. This effect then decreases the incen- 
tives for workers to change jobs. 
Thus, adverse selection may seriously impair 
the ability of workers to change jobs and can 
interfere with the efficient operation of the labor 
market. Because of this market failure, it is natural 
to ask whether a government action to subsidize 
mobility can reduce the severity of adverse selec- 
tion and improve the functioning of the labor 
market. However, it is shown that such a govern- 
ment action will have no  real consequences. The 
reason is that bonds arise in the model in order 
for firms to compete for the high-productivity 
workers. Subsidizing mobility hurts the infre- 
quent job-movers (the high-productivityworkers), 
leading firms to increase the amount of bonds 
required by incoming workers. This increase in 
bonding offsets the subsidy given to job-movers, 
leaving the government action ineffective. 
The paper also suggests that adverse selection 
will not be a problem for job-changers if  they are 
paid a piece rate or with a contingent wage con- 
tract. Recent actions by firms to pay their workers 
bonuses and stock options may ease the impact 
of adverse selection. Future work is needed to 
address whether these types of contracts are aris- 
ing as a result of adverse selection and whether 
these contracts may lead to a more fluid and 
efficient labor market. 
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